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[Excerpt] Ghostworkers and Greens shows how farmworker groups often drew connections to the larger 
public in their pesticide reform efforts in order to increase the number of people supporting their 
campaigns and compensate for their lack of political and economic power. While several agricultural 
chemicals carried the risk of poisoning farmworkers, the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee 
(UFWOC) focused its initial campaign on DDT, the infamous persistent pesticide whose threat extended 
well beyond the bounds of the field. The launch of subsequent campaigns followed incidents of 
widespread poisoning of the public by pesticide residue. Cesar Chavez and other organizers argued that 
growers’ misuse of pesticides threatened the public and farmworkers alike and that the problem could be 
resolved with a strong union presence in the fields. Other farmworker groups like the Maricopa County 
Organizing Project, Arizona Farm Workers, and the Farmworker Association of Florida focused their water 
quality, and ozone depletion. They similarly connected farmworker health issues to broader concerns. 
Additionally, these groups devoted resources to educational efforts among farmworkers, teaching 
workers and their families how to best protect their health around dangerous agricultural chemicals. The 
organizations used lawsuits to gain leverage as well. The public face of their campaigns, though, typically 
sought to establish a bond with people and groups having little direct connection to the fields. 
This book also demonstrates that environmental organizations espoused a similar rhetoric of 
cooperation, suggesting that environmentalists and workers should work together on issues when 
interests overlapped. Organizers of the first Earth Day stressed the value of building alliances with 
organizations associated with other causes, stating that the potential for cooperative campaigns was 
innumerable because pollution affected everyone regardless of race or social standing. Recently formed 
environmental organizations like the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), the Natural Resources Defense 
Council (NRDC), and Friends of Earth (FoE) embraced the expanded vision of environmentalism readily. Of 
the older conservation groups, the Sierra Club showed the greatest enthusiasm for tackling new 
challenges. This is made clear in Sierra Club Bulletin editorials from the early 1970s that spoke of the 
compatibility of environmentalism and social justice. Environmental organizations knew that workers and 
environmentalists would not agree on everything, but recognized the value of finding common ground and 
cooperating on issues of mutual interest. Many environmental groups continued to voice support for 
partnerships with labor organizations in the 1980s and beyond. 
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C o n f r o n t i n g  t h e  C o n s e q u e n c e s  
o f  t h e  P e s t i c i d e  P a r a d i g m
A chemical euphoria overtook American agriculture in the twentieth cen­
tury. Dabbling with botanical control agents and soap-based emulsions to 
control insect threats, which had begun in the nineteenth century, soon 
gave way to experimentation with arsenical compounds that carried a 
greater kick. As growers became more enmeshed in the world of agri­
cultural chemicals, their poison-free “friends” of the past, biological and 
cultural forms of pest control, seemed less appealing and less suited for 
the times. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), pesti­
cide manufacturers, land grant colleges, and entomologists acted as facili­
tators that encouraged the use of a cornucopia of chemicals. DDT proved 
to be the gateway substance that led to the use of exponentially greater vol­
umes of more powerful chemical combinations in agricultural production. 
Growers denied the existence of problems as evidence began to appear, 
choosing instead to trust more heavily in a variety of economic poisons 
until in the post-World War II period they became almost wholly depen­
dent upon pesticides for crop protection.
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The suggestion of addiction in the preceding paragraph is deliberate. 
“Chemical dependence” is a phrase most often employed in the discussion 
of persons who habitually use drugs or alcohol, yet it is an equally fitting 
descriptor of growers’ increasing reliance on pesticides in their operations 
and is a helpful frame of reference for understanding their strong resis­
tance to reform efforts from 1962 onward. Agricultural chemicals came 
to greater use with the accession of Leland Howard, an entomologist who 
touted their supremacy over other methods of pest control, to the head of 
the USDA’s Bureau of Entomology. The volume of pesticides applied to 
fields grew markedly in the first half of the twentieth century before sky­
rocketing in the post-World War II era with the introduction of DDT to 
commercial markets. In what political scientist Christopher Bosso charac­
terizes as the “golden age of pesticides,” with little debate about risks and 
minimal regulation, production of the compound tripled from 100 to 300 
million pounds in the five years after the war’s end and doubled again in 
the decade following.1 DDT and other new brands of synthetic chemicals 
promised fast action, greater efficiency, and universal applicability. Grow­
ers, captivated by the promise of total control and possible eradication of 
pests, applied pesticides in ever-increasing volumes. Insect pests, however, 
showed a remarkably proclivity for developing resistance to the chemi­
cals designed to kill them. Still, researchers, pesticide manufacturers, and 
growers continued to invest heavily in chemical controls even as pests de­
veloped immunities to some of them. Growers saturated their fields with 
voluminous concentrations of more powerful chemical combinations, 
holding to the faith that pesticides would best prevent crop damage and 
financial loss. The remarkable ability of insects to continually develop new 
resistance to potent pesticides actually helped entrench chemical controls 
further in the modern industrial agriculture production system.
The chemical dependency in agriculture bears comparison to path 
dependency in other technological systems. Historians David Nye and 
Thomas Hughes introduce the concept of path dependency into their 
discussions of energy systems. They contend that when a system is in the 
process of being developed, decision makers have a wide range of options 
and flexibility in its design and function. As the system matures, however, 
it becomes path dependent: earlier choices narrow the range of options 
available for changing it.2 This model applies just as aptly to the system 
of pest control used by growers in the United States. As chemical controls
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became entrenched in agricultural production, biological and cultural 
control methods seemed less viable. Historian James McWilliams recog­
nizes a path dependency in agricultural pest management, asserting that 
the investment of growers, government, and manufacturers in chemical 
solutions “limited the way in which scientists and farmers framed the pest 
situation and contemplated their options.”3 The investment and the faith 
in chemicals made the switch to other forms of pest control an improbable 
prospect.
Some regulation existed during the “golden age of pesticides” but it 
was not intended to impose a burden on growers by limiting their pest 
control options. The Insecticide Act of 1910 required that agricultural 
chemicals carry accurate product labeling, while the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947 (FIFRA) made it necessary for 
manufacturers to attest to the efficacy of a pesticide and register it with 
the USDA before introducing it to the commercial marketplace. FIFRA 
also mandated that warning labels inform growers about potential risks to 
health, plants, or vertebrate animals. It did not, however, keep dangerous 
chemicals from being sold. Regulations to protect public health and the en­
vironment proved severely lacking and pesticide use rose unabated. Nei­
ther growers nor the USDA pushed for more stringent regulations to limit 
use of chemicals that posed a threat to human or environmental health. 
The parties with a vested interest in agricultural policymaking at this time 
all held to the “pesticide paradigm,” that agricultural chemicals were an 
indispensable component of modern agricultural production.4 Since the 
public remained uninterested in pesticide issues in the immediate postwar 
era, an iron triangle of interests developed; hence, policymaking, as Bosso 
demonstrates, was “clearly accommodative in tone,” with government of­
ficials primarily concerned with the interests of their clients, the agricul­
tural industry.5
Rachel Carson awoke the nation to the dangers of pesticides in 1962 
with the publication of Silent Spring. She was one of a group of scientists 
who harbored concern about some of the unintended consequences arising 
from the proliferation of economic poisons. They believed that complex 
scientific data needed to be communicated to the public in an understand­
able, nonpartisan manner, democratizing the information so that people 
would be better able to make informed personal and political decisions 
about the use of a broad range of potentially hazardous chemicals and new
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technologies in society. According to historian Michael Egan, the science 
information movement, of which biologist Barry Commoner was at the 
forefront, believed that informed debate and dissent are fundamental to 
the maintenance of a functioning democracy and consciously worked to 
make the best available information accessible to the public.6 Carson held 
to this philosophy as well and intended Silent Spring to be a call for citizen 
engagement in pesticide politics and regulation. She believed that citizens 
had a right to participate in decisions on how and to what extent pesticides 
would be used on farms, forests, and suburban neighborhoods. Historian 
Karl Brooks asserts that Carson tapped into a public concern about the 
environment that had been building prior to 1962, stating that “Ameri­
cans’ shared personal and civic experiences—what they had done, seen, 
and thought before 1963—laid a cultural powder trail that Silent Spring’s 
bright flame ignited.”7 Carson’s communication of scientific information 
to the public empowered individuals and groups with knowledge, giving 
them a degree of expertise that could be used to influence public policy and 
private practices.
Civic Engagement, Science, and Environmental 
Health Reform
Numerous scholars recognize the fundamental importance of public en­
gagement in issues related to industrial toxins, environment, and health. 
Robert Gottlieb locates the first campaigns for environmental reform in 
the Progressive Era, with citizens like Alice Hamilton initiating efforts to 
control pollution in the urban environment.8 Examining the roots of envi­
ronmental health science, Christopher Sellers contends that “an energized 
labor movement unsettled employers’ assumptions about whether they 
were treating their workers fairly and catalyzed new legislative and ju­
dicial foundations for tending to worker health” between 1910 and 1930.9 
Alan Derickson argues that public health officials knew about the dele­
terious effects of coal dust for over fifty years, yet proved reluctant to ad­
dress the issue of black lung until the “confrontational collective action” 
of a worker-based social movement necessitated change.10 David Rosner 
and Gerald Markowitz assert that response to silicosis, an occupational 
lung disease, paralleled the rise of labor activism in the 1930s, while the
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subsequent waning of government attention to the problem followed a de­
cline in union influence.11 In their next collaboration, Deceit and Denial, 
Rosner and Markowitz show that the lead and vinyl industries hid infor­
mation about occupational risks and used soft money and donations to po­
litical action committees to placate certain elected officials and forestall the 
enactment of new regulations. The industries’ actions, they state, became 
known as a result of lawsuits brought by poisoned workers.12 Cancer ex­
pert and doctor of environmental and occupational medicine Samuel 
Epstein concludes that nearly every legislative regulation or reform to pro­
tect workers and consumers against cancer had its roots in a public interest 
group or labor organization.13
Public engagement in pesticide issues similarly proved a necessary 
predicate to reforming pest control practices in agriculture, since both 
growers and the USD A, the primary regulatory agency prior to 1972, pre­
sumed that chemicals were the single best pest control option. In an at­
tempt to make agricultural pest control less harmful to the environment 
and human health, nongovernmental organizations employed a variety of 
strategies to curb pesticide usage that ranged from focusing on a single 
chemical to passing laws that reshaped the regulatory landscape. Growers’ 
associations and the USD A consistently opposed efforts to restrict the use 
of agricultural chemicals or remove them from the marketplace. Similar 
to the tactics employed by industrial manufacturers, they tried to delay 
reform by downplaying risk, fostering doubt about existent scientific data, 
calling for more scientific studies, and leaning on sympathetic politicians 
and government officials for support. Pesticide reform advocates gener­
ated publicity and contested industry claims. Their efforts helped restrict 
or ban several dangerous pesticides and have forced growers to adopt safer 
pesticide use practices, though there are certainly still issues that remain to 
be addressed.
Scientists concerned about the unintended consequences of technologi­
cal innovations sometimes struggled over the degree to which they should 
be visibly involved in political discourse. Certainly not all reach the same 
decision as Barry Commoner, Rachel Carson, and others in the science in­
formation movement. Historians Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway state 
that “scientists consider their ‘real’ work to be the production of knowl­
edge, not its dissemination, and they view these two activities as mutu­
ally exclusive,” noting that scientists who try to bridge the gap between
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academic and popular audiences risk being unfavorably labeled as “popu­
larizes.”14 Hence, while Silent Spring reached millions of readers, subse­
quent scientific findings revealing the human health and environmental 
risks of pesticides did not get publicized in the same fashion. Some scien­
tists also feared that political engagement would jeopardize the objectiv­
ity upon which scientific work is premised.15 Environmental and health 
policy, however, grows from an amalgam of scientific knowledge, ethical 
premises, and public opinion. It is necessarily important, then, that scien­
tific knowledge be effectively communicated to the public.16
Political scientist Karen Litfin argues that “knowledge brokers” serve 
as “intermediaries between the original researchers, or producers of 
knowledge, and the policy makers who consume that knowledge but lack 
the time and training necessary to absorb the original research.”17 These 
knowledge brokers play the same role in shaping public opinion. The 
information presented by them often bears the imprint of their values. 
Different knowledge brokers interpret scientific results in varying ways, 
choosing which results to emphasize and how to address the issue of sci­
entific uncertainty. Consequently, Litfin holds that science alone will “not 
likely to save us from environmental ruin, persistent political action in­
formed by carefully chosen discursive strategies might.”18
Common Ground and Collaboration in Pesticide Reform
Indiscriminate use of pesticides concern environmentalists and farmwork­
ers alike and their representative organizations have acted as important 
knowledge brokers advocating for pesticide reform. An interest in the 
preservation of environmental and human health committed a number 
of environmental organizations to campaigns for pesticide reform in the 
nearly fifty-year history of activism since the publication of Silent Spring. 
Organizations of farmworkers or groups representing them shared a simi­
lar desire to make agricultural pest control safer, since farmworkers risked 
injury to their personal and family health when exposed to pesticides in the 
fields. While both environmental organizations and farmworker groups 
acted as knowledge brokers and engaged in separate efforts to reform pes­
ticide use practices, their common interest in protecting human health fa­
cilitated the development of episodic collaborative campaigns.
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Farmworker groups, in particular, recognized the value of building 
bridges to outside organizations and groups. Farmworkers represent a 
marginal, often invisible, segment of the populace. These “ghostworkers,” 
as they were called for a time in Arizona, wield less power than workers 
in other industries as a result of poverty, migratory work patterns, exemp­
tion from protective labor laws like the National Labor Relations Act, and 
sometimes undocumented immigrant status. Decades of effort at organiz­
ing farmworkers in the first half of the twentieth century failed to come 
anywhere close to the gains of unions in the industrial sector. Historian 
Jacquelyn Jones argues that agricultural migrants in the East were “sys­
tematically alienated from every level of the body politic” in the 1930s and 
1940s.19 Cindy Hahamovitch similarly characterizes migrant farmworkers 
as “stateless” persons lacking political power.20 Years of frustrated organiz­
ing efforts made clear that farmworkers needed allies if they were to win 
gains from growers or government. This fits sociologist Melvin Hall’s ar­
gument that people are the primary source of power in poor people’s orga­
nizations and that forming relationships with outside groups may be used 
as a means of building strength in a campaign.21 Sociologists Guy Burgess 
and Heidi Burgess similarly contend that one way for “low-power” groups 
to compensate for the absence of political and economic strength “is to en­
list the help of external or more powerful groups.”22 Since farmworkers 
lacked political and economic capital, it behooved them to build bridges to 
other organizations and the public to enlarge their base of support.
Ghostworkers and Greens shows how farmworker groups often drew 
connections to the larger public in their pesticide reform efforts in order to 
increase the number of people supporting their campaigns and compensate 
for their lack of political and economic power. While several agricultural 
chemicals carried the risk of poisoning farmworkers, the United Farm 
Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC) focused its initial campaign 
on DDT, the infamous persistent pesticide whose threat extended well 
beyond the bounds of the field. The launch of subsequent campaigns fol­
lowed incidents of widespread poisoning of the public by pesticide residue. 
Cesar Chavez and other organizers argued that growers’ misuse of pesti­
cides threatened the public and farmworkers alike and that the problem 
could be resolved with a strong union presence in the fields. Other farm­
worker groups like the Maricopa County Organizing Project, Arizona 
Farm Workers, and the Farmworker Association of Florida focused their
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attempts to elicit public concern on issues of pesticide drift, ground- 
water quality, and ozone depletion. They similarly connected farmworker 
health issues to broader concerns. Additionally, these groups devoted re­
sources to educational efforts among farmworkers, teaching workers and 
their families how to best protect their health around dangerous agricul­
tural chemicals. The organizations used lawsuits to gain leverage as well. 
The public face of their campaigns, though, typically sought to establish a 
bond with people and groups having little direct connection to the fields.
This book also demonstrates that environmental organizations es­
poused a similar rhetoric of cooperation, suggesting that environmentalists 
and workers should work together on issues when interests overlapped. 
Organizers of the first Earth Day stressed the value of building alliances 
with organizations associated with other causes, stating that the potential 
for cooperative campaigns was innumerable because pollution affected 
everyone regardless of race or social standing. Recently formed environ­
mental organizations like the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), the 
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and Friends of Earth (FoE) 
embraced the expanded vision of environmentalism readily. Of the older 
conservation groups, the Sierra Club showed the greatest enthusiasm for 
tackling new challenges. This is made clear in Sierra Club Bulletin editori­
als from the early 1970s that spoke of the compatibility of environmental­
ism and social justice. Environmental organizations knew that workers 
and environmentalists would not agree on everything, but recognized the 
value of finding common ground and cooperating on issues of mutual in­
terest. Many environmental groups continued to voice support for partner­
ships with labor organizations in the 1980s and beyond.
These attempts at outreach lack visibility in scholarly literature as divi­
sions between the blue and green movements are often emphasized more 
than common ground. The “jobs versus environment” trope pervades 
popular and academic discussions on the topic. Historian Richard White 
contends that “environmentalists so often seem self-righteous, privileged, 
and arrogant because they so readily consent to identifying nature with 
play and make it by definition a place where leisured humans come only 
to visit and not to work, stay, or live,” and reasons that this leads them to 
“frame environmental issues so that the choice seems to be between hu­
mans and nature.”23 This is certainly true of the epic battles over the future 
of old-growth forests in the Pacific Northwest that White references in
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his essay. Yet this understanding can also be an oversimplification, a false 
dichotomy employed by opponents of regulation in a classic “divide and 
conquer” strategy.24 Sociologist Brian Mayer acknowledges the class dif­
ferences to which White refers, but suggests that “externalities such as en­
vironmental pollution and occupational health hazards disproportionately 
affect those at the lower end of the socioeconomic structure, the working 
class, which theoretically creates allies between environmentalists and or­
ganizations like unions that tend to represent working class individuals”25 
The efforts of labor and environmental organizations to address issues of 
seemingly mutual concern warrant closer scrutiny by scholars so that the 
nature of relations between the two movements can be better understood. 
This work contributes to that understanding with its investigation of the 
engagement of environmental organizations and farmworker groups in 
pesticide reform.
Previous comparative expositions of pesticide campaigns do not ad­
equately address cooperation between the two groups. Historian Robert 
Gordon, who often explores the intersections of the labor and environ­
mental movement, argues that “the battle to restrict the use of DDT is 
in many ways indicative of the gulf between the United Farm Workers 
(UFW) and the environmental mainstream,” contending that the Sierra 
Club and other leading environmental groups cared about the effect of 
persistent pesticides on “natural wildlife, not on Latino farmworkers.”26 
Qualitative social scientist Laura Pulido maintains that environmentalists 
chose to “focus on quality-of-life issues in which the social actors are fairly 
removed from the actual threat,” incorrectly asserting that “once DDT 
was banned, mainstream environmental groups retreated from the issue 
of pesticides for a number of years, thinking the problem was solved.”27 In 
a subsequent co-authored article, Pulido and anthropologist Devon Pena 
hold that “mainstream environmentalists focused on protecting wilderness 
areas and consumers from pesticides, while ignoring the plight of farm­
workers,” and assert that environmentalists’ “narrow articulation of the 
environment” rendered them “incapable of an oppositional politics that 
would allow them to make connections between agribusiness, the state, 
environmental degradation, and [the] highly exploited.” They suggest that 
environmentalists’ constrained view of pesticide problems was attribut­
able to their “positionality” as college-educated white persons (often male), 
“privileged in their socioeconomic status,” who lived far from the fields
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and had a “limited political consciousness.”28 A close examination of the 
rhetoric and actions of mainstream environmentalists shows that such 
sweeping generalizations are problematic. Here I illustrate that environ- 
mental organizations and farmworker groups recognized their common 
interests on multiple occasions and collaborated in a number of efforts 
both before and after the 1972 DDT ban.
The work histories of leaders and organizers introduced in the follow­
ing case studies, in fact, sometimes overlapped the social justice and en­
vironmental movements. EDF co-founder Victor Yannacone represented 
the NAACP for nine years before shifting his attention to environmental 
issues. Chicano activist Arturo Sandoval also organized activities for the 
first Earth Day in the southwest. Earth Day organizer and Sierra Club lob­
byist Linda Billings later translated her concern about farmworkers and 
pesticides into a new position as the director of pesticide farm safety staff 
at the Environmental Protection Agency. Al Meyerhoff began his career 
with California Rural Legal Assistance before becoming an NRDC attor­
ney. David Roe authored California’s Safe Drinking Water and Toxics 
Enforcement Act when he was an EDF senior attorney. He later tran­
sitioned into a senior council position at Human Rights First. Historian 
Adam Rome argues that “the rise of the environmental movement owed 
much to the events of the 1960s,” and suggests that scholars should con­
sider the underexplored connections between environmentalism and other 
social movements.29 Undoubtedly, the examples of overlap in this study 
and those mentioned by Rome represent only a sample of persons who 
transitioned from an environmental group to an organization focused 
more specifically on social justice and vice versa.
Cooperative efforts between farmworker groups and environmentalists 
often depended upon the work of bridge-builders within one or more of 
the organizations. I argue in this book that bridge-builders transcended 
differences between organizations and ably negotiated the cultural terrain 
of diverse movements to foster working relationships.30 Staff profession­
als played a critical role in farmworker organizations. Nurse practitioner 
and boycott coordinator Marion Moses, for example, initiated contacts 
with scientists and the Environmental Defense Fund on behalf of Cesar 
Chavez and UFWOC in the 1960s. Maricopa County Organizing Proj­
ect attorney Nadine Wettstein similarly established working relationships 
with the local chapter of the Sierra Club and Arizona Common Cause
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to establish Arizona Clean Water Advocates. Farmworker Association of 
Florida Pesticide Safety and Environmental Health Project Coordinator 
Jeannie Economos and Administrator Sister Gail Grimes served as the pri­
mary contacts for FoE in the Sustainable Tomatoes/Safer Communities 
campaign. Sierra Club leaders— Raymond Sherwin, William Futrell, Will 
Siri, Michael McCloskey—issued invitations for partnerships with labor 
unions on issues of mutual interest, while some lobbyists like Linda Bill­
ings networked with different farmworker groups. NRDC attorney A1 
Meyerhoff undertook efforts to maintain a working relationship between 
his organization and the UFW in the wake of Cesar Chavez’s passing. 
These individuals facilitated the growth of collaborative efforts between 
the farmworker movement and the environmental movement.
Sociologists Sherry Cable, Tamara Mix, and Donald Hastings suggest 
that the most effective working relationships between environmentalists 
and environmental justice activists occur when the environmental justice 
organization has a professional staffer who shares a common background 
(well-educated and middle-class) with environmentalists and functions as 
a bridge between the groups.31 These case studies add support to that con­
tention. Often the individuals within the farmworker organizations who 
communicated with environmental groups had not previously worked in 
the fields. Rather they were professionals committed to principles of social 
justice, and their level of education and professional background likely fa­
cilitated communication between the organizations.
Differences in strategy and timing limited cooperative opportunities to 
some extent. Though the collaborative efforts between movements often 
proved temporary, I contend that this does not weaken the significance. 
Political scientist David Meyer maintains that cooperative endeavors and 
coalitions lack permanence and that “the peak of mobilization is always 
limited.” He argues that “changes in policy, political alignments, or even 
rhetoric alter the constellation of political opportunities for each organiza­
tion.”32 Organizations do often drift apart at the conclusion of a trial or 
when efforts to enact new regulatory laws end in success or failure, but 
in the cases studied here, channels of communication remained open for 
future collaborations between farmworker groups and environmentalists 
that maintained a keen interest in pesticide issues for roughly fifty years 
since the release of Silent Spring. The different organizations, however, 
also addressed a host of different issues and shifted resources to address
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other concerns during that time as well. This book shows that the possi­
bility of reestablishing cooperative arrangements arose when the different 
organizations returned their focus to pesticides at the same time and when 
strategies and goals aligned.
Overview
Chapters 1 and 2 briefly explain the development of chemically intensive, 
industrial-style agriculture in the United States. The first chapter shows 
how growers’ early concerns about economic poisons gave way to an ar­
dent belief that pesticides were an indispensable necessity in their ongoing 
war against insect predators. It simultaneously charts changes in govern­
ment agencies and professions connected with agriculture and the evo­
lution of clientele politics and pesticide regulation through the Federal, 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947. The chapter follow­
ing focuses on another key change in the transformation of farms into 
what Carey McWilliams so poignantly characterized as “factories in the 
fields.” It examines the growth of a large marginalized, often migratory, 
workforce that was systematically disempowered by growers and govern­
ment. These hidden hands of the harvest fell out of view of the public 
eye and did not benefit from the protection of the growing body of labor 
laws in the mid-twentieth century. Consequently, it behooved the people 
most effected by the deleterious effects of pesticides to find allies outside 
of the agricultural industry in their reform campaigns because they had 
been rendered powerless in formal politics. Together these chapters set the 
foundation for the examination of cooperative efforts in pesticide reform 
that follow in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 3 begins with the publication of Silent Spring in 1962 and 
shows how concerned scientists disseminated information about the ill ef­
fects of pesticides directly and indirectly to UFWOC and environmental 
groups. The belief that an informed citizenry would be better able to de­
bate and make decisions about innovations that had potentially adverse 
effects on people and the environment underlay this scientific information 
movement. Both environmentalists and farmworker groups showed in­
creasing concern about pesticides, particularly DDT, as they understood 
more about the problem, but developed fairly different strategies in their
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attempts to make change. I argue that the variance in strategies limited but 
did not preclude opportunities for collaboration between the two move­
ments. Cooperation happened most often in mounting legal challenges.
The next chapter tracks the pesticide reform efforts of UFW and main­
stream environmental organizations in the years immediately following 
the DDT ban. Contrary to the predominant scholarly narrative, environ­
mentalists remained invested in the issue. Environmental organizations, 
particularly the Sierra Club, showed interest in a broadened range of en­
vironmental issues and expanded their lobbying efforts to address many of 
these concerns. They consistently stressed the fundamental importance of 
securing the public’s “right to know” about pesticides and better democ­
ratizing decision making on related issues. Opportunities for collabora­
tion with the UFW proved fleeting though, because union battles with the 
Teamsters between 1972 and 1976 consumed so much of the organization’s 
resources.
Chapter 5 narrows the focus to state-level pesticide politics in Arizona 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Both farmworkers and suburban families af­
fected by pesticide drift tried to make the grower-dominated Board of 
Pesticide Control more responsive to the concerns of the public. However, 
these efforts rarely occurred concurrently, so collaborative campaigns did 
not develop between the groups for many years, in part because grow­
ers’ associations recognized the potential power and threat of a cross-class 
coalition and strategized to keep one from developing. When the oppor­
tunity finally arose in 1984, farmworkers joined with suburbanites and 
environmentalists to overcome the power of the agricultural lobby and 
reshape pesticide governance in the state.
The next chapter also looks at state-level activism with an examination 
of responses to the deregulatory efforts of California Governor George 
Deukmejian in the 1980s. With the gains of the previous decade under 
assault, environmentalists and unions partnered to counter the governor’s 
attacks. The labor-environmental coalition filed lawsuits to force enforce­
ment of existent law and continued to support legislative measures that 
would help protect public health. California Rural Legal Assistance part­
nered with environmental organizations on multiple occasions during this 
period. Meanwhile Chavez and the UFW set their sights on eliminating 
five pesticides from use, hoping that a renewed nationwide boycott would 
bring enough economic pressure to bear on growers that they would
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negotiate new contracts. Environmentalists, by comparison, committed 
their energies to mobilizing California voters to pass a sweeping toxics 
initiative that fundamentally changed the state’s regulatory landscape. 
Both efforts shared the common goal of better protecting the health of 
farmworkers and the public, but variant scopes and campaign strategies 
hampered collaboration. Still, cooperation between the UFW and environ­
mentalists occurred on a limited basis in California during this period.
The final case study, in Chapter 7, encompasses pesticide politics from 
the local to the international level, centering on the long struggle to halt 
usage of methyl bromide. Signatory nations of the Montreal Protocol, 
an international treaty to curb ozone depletion, amended the agreement 
with a phase-out schedule for methyl bromide soon after its deleterious 
effects on the atmosphere were discovered. Growers associations put up 
a fierce resistance to the plan, using uncertainty in science to foster doubt 
about its necessity. Environmental groups and farmworker organizations 
functioned in part as a counterweight against growers’ lobbying; in par­
ticular, the Farmworker Association of Florida partnered with FoE in a 
campaign against methyl bromide. Together they publicized that the fu­
migant posed a threat not only to atmospheric integrity, but to the health 
of farmworkers in the fields and people living in adjacent communities. 
This chapter also discusses joint efforts between farmworker groups and 
environmental organizations in California to advance the phase-out sched­
ule. Though the fumigant continues to be used to a limited degree in the 
United States to this day, the collaborative efforts of regulatory proponents 
added information about the hazardousness of methyl bromide to bank of 
knowledge and hastened the switch to viable alternatives. Just as they have 
done consistently since the mid-1960s, environmental organizations and 
farmworker groups continue to compile pesticide data; analyze risks and 
educate the public; initiate reform campaigns in attempt to resolve press­
ing problems; and collaborate with each another when timing, strategies, 
and goals overlap.
1S o w i n g  t h e  S e e d s  o f  
C h e m i c a l  D e p e n d e n c y
The end of World War II heralded an era of agriculture in which many 
growers unflaggingly put their faith in chemicals as their primary means 
of pest control. Synthetic compounds offered growers a previously un­
obtainable mastery over nature. Pesticides had a long history of usage in 
the United States prior to the introduction of synthetic chemicals, but 
were never relied upon as completely as they were after 1945. The em­
brace of these powerful new poisons solidified a path dependency in 
agriculture that made it ever more difficult for growers and entomolo­
gists to switch from chemical control technology to other systems of pest 
management.1
Farmers employed folk remedies, botanicals, and soap-based emul­
sions as agricultural development spread westward across the nation. 
Pyrethrum became the first botanical insecticide sold commercially, but 
its high cost limited its appeal.2 Soap solutions offered a more afford­
able pest control option beginning in the 1840s, making usage more fea­
sible as monoculture became more common.3 Changing vast stretches of
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complex ecosystems into much simpler forms significantly heightened 
threats of insect damage to crops. California growers who imported non- 
native nursery stocks for cultivation in the burgeoning citrus industry 
accidentally imported a host of serious pests, like the San Jose Scale, as 
well.4 Transcontinental rail lines further hastened the spread of pest in­
festations. The unwanted insects feasted in the new simplified environ­
ments and had few native predators to keep their numbers in check.5 
Growers increasingly considered insecticides as an option as they faced 
greater risks of crop damage.
Copper acetoarsenite, commercially sold as Paris Green, became 
the first widely used chemical poison in agricultural pest control in the 
early 1860s. Other compounds bearing names like London Purple, Paris 
Purple, and Scheele’s Green soon competed for favor on the market, 
but Paris Green remained the arsenic-based poison of choice well into 
the late nineteenth century.6 Arsenic, of course, kills more than target 
insects and negative stories periodically filtered through to the press. 
The poison likely killed thousands of fish in the Connecticut River in 
1878 after heavy rains washed the chemical into the waterway from ad­
jacent fields.7 It also posed risks to careless farmers, and to consumers 
who purchased fruit with excessive residues.8 Its extreme toxicity actu­
ally made it popular with individuals harboring suicidal intent or mur­
derous thoughts.9 Despite its potential for causing unintended harm, 
American farmers applied two thousand tons of Paris Green to crops 
annually by 1896.10
Pesticide applications increased with the development of a profes­
sional class of economic entomologists. Most farmers lacked the finan­
cial resources necessary to pay for independent consultations, yet a series 
of devastating locust outbreaks between 1873 and 1876 made clear the 
need for improved pest control. Missouri state entomologist Charles 
Valentine Riley argued for an increased federal role and helped con­
vince Congress to allocate funds for the creation of a three-man Ento­
mological Commission in 1876.11 The passage of the Hatch Act in 1887 
created opportunities for the growing class of professionals who soon 
found employment in a host of government agencies and public insti­
tutions, including the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), land 
grant universities, state agricultural experiment stations, and extension 
services.12
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Still, neither farmers nor entomologists wholly put their faith in chemi­
cal control methods. Farmers continued to employ cultural methods of 
control that had worked for them in the past. These practices included 
the alteration of planting schedules, intercropping, hybridization, and the 
use of lure plants to draw predacious insects away from cash crops.13 The 
majority of chemicals in this period carried unproven, often fraudulent 
claims about the effectiveness and safety of the products. The USD A re­
ported that nineteen out of forty-five tested samples of Paris Green con­
tained unallowable amounts of sodium sulfate. Other pesticides contained 
high levels of arsenic that would burn crop foliage. Nearly 20 percent of 
tested pyrethrum contained a “poisonous substance” that posed a threat to 
applicators.14 No regulatory laws existed, though, to prevent companies 
from making dubious claims about adulterated pesticides. Consequently, 
many farmers remained wary and those that did not sometimes suffered fi­
nancial loss.15 The difficulties of preparing mixtures, the instability of some 
compounds, and the necessity of considering variables like weather slowed 
the process by which chemical controls were incorporated into agricultural 
production practices.16
Entomologists did not solely focus on chemical solutions either, choos­
ing instead to experiment with a variety of techniques to protect crops 
from insects. Experimental farms tested biological, cultural, and chemi­
cal controls to determine the best combination of strategies.17 The United 
States Entomological Commission, for instance, recommended that Great 
Plains farmers extinguish autumn prairie fires so that there would be fuel 
for controlled burning to combat locust infestations in the spring.18 Re­
spected entomologist Charles Riley recognized the utility of pesticides 
like Paris Green and London Purple in some circumstances, but thought 
it “unwise and unsafe to employ such poisons, or to recommend them” in 
other situations.19 Riley continued to show favor for biological controls 
after becoming chief of the Bureau of Entomology in 1881, holding that 
every insect pest had a predator to keep its population in check.20 Bio­
logical controls received an additional boost when the nonnative ladybug, 
a natural predator of the problematic fluted scale, saved the California 
citrus industry from devastation. Yet separate campaigns against the 
gypsy moth and the boll weevil that respectively employed biological and 
cultural controls proved embarrassing public failures for the Bureau of 
Entomology.21
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The unsuccessful gypsy moth and boll weevil campaigns contributed 
to the Bureau of Entomology’s shift toward more chemical solutions in 
agriculture. Leland Howard, who replaced Riley as chief, always harbored 
more interest in agricultural chemicals than his predecessor. Unlike ear­
lier generations of entomologists who received their training on the farm 
and in the fields, Howard gained his knowledge in the classrooms and 
laboratories of Cornell University. The time spent at Cornell undoubtedly 
exposed him to the discourse of scientific colleagues who still character­
ized entomologists as amateurish bug-catchers, despite their clear attempts 
to define themselves as a professional class. The development of chemical 
solutions to solve pest problems held the possibility of granting entomolo­
gists access to the more prestigious ranks of scientists. Pesticides’ promise 
of universal applicability, fast action, and predictable results fit the mood 
of an era that valued standardization, efficiency, and progress.22 Howard 
increasingly treated agricultural chemicals as the best and most reliable 
form of pest control.23
If farmers were to rely more heavily on chemical controls, they had 
to trust more completely in the effectiveness of pesticides. New York 
in 1898 and California in 1901 passed legislation intended to curtail 
fraudulent claims from pesticide manufacturers.24 Howard and other 
entomologists lobbied Congress for national legislation that would es­
tablish guidelines for the manufacture and sale of agricultural chemi­
cals.25 The National Grange, the American Apple Growers’ Congress, 
the New York State Fruit Growers Association, and several state hor­
ticultural societies urged Congress to pass a bill regulating agricultural 
chemicals, believing it necessary to protect farmers’ economic interests. 
Major pesticide manufacturers similarly supported the passage of the 
Insecticide Act of 1910, recognizing that profits would grow if trust in 
their product increased.26
The component parts of the Insecticide Act centered on protecting 
farmers from dubious claims about the efficacy of pesticides.27 It required 
companies to accurately describe the effects of their products and list inert 
ingredients on labels. The act set purity and strength standards for the 
two most popular agricultural chemicals, Paris Green and lead arsenate.28 
It also charged the newly created Insecticide and Fungicide Board with 
the responsibility of making sure that manufacturers followed the new 
guidelines.29 The board undertook scientific investigations to determine
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the effects of various pesticides on insects, fungi, and commercial crops; 
conducted hearings on alleged violations of the law; and engaged in edu­
cational outreach efforts to help bring pesticide manufacturers into com­
pliance.30 Concerns about human and environmental health did not factor 
into the passage of the law.31
Entomologists found opportunity to bolster their professional status 
and improve public perceptions of agricultural chemicals during World 
War I. Howard believed that the profession was poised to make an im­
portant contribution to the war effort by protecting critical foodstuffs and 
other agricultural commodities. He and others further concluded that the 
pressures of the global crisis necessitated that pest issues have solutions that 
were universally applicable, fast-acting, and effective. When boll worms 
infested fields of castor beans that were used to lubricate airplane engine 
cylinders, entomologists did not have the luxury of time to develop a bio­
logical or cultural response to the problem.32 Farmers likewise valued solu­
tions that delivered quick results and it was the bureau’s charge to satisfy 
the demands of its primary customers. The Bureau of Entomology contin­
ued to consider biological and cultural controls, but turned increasingly to 
chemical solutions.33
American chemical companies, hoping to continue the expansion of 
their markets after the end of the European conflict, invested in research 
as never before and promoted the agricultural use of pesticides. Advertis­
ing attempted to sway consumers who still harbored a degree of distrust 
about the ability of chemicals to conquer pests without harming commer­
cial crops. Manufacturers promised that their products would vanquish 
insect foes rather than simply control populations, casting pesticides as the 
best means to counter the insect hordes.34 This tone matched the character 
of messages from the Bureau of Entomology and Leland Howard, who 
warned that “the great armies of insect pests . . . are our worst rivals and 
enemies.”35
The rhetoric appealed to growers in an increasingly capital-intensive 
industry. Nearly all of the agricultural innovations of the twentieth 
century—machinery, pesticides, fertilizers, irrigation developments— 
raised the fixed cost of production. The technological developments 
promised increased yields with less labor, but required greater invest­
ments up front. The most commercially successful farmers adopted 
the new technologies despite the added cost. Those who chose not to
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adapt or could not afford to do so became less viable in the market­
place and gradually disappeared. As a result, from the 1930s onward, 
farms became increasingly consolidated into the hands of persons with 
a higher level of education, wealth, and power. This group generally 
valued managerial skills and technological efficiency over hard physical 
labor.36 Chemicals promising total control of pest populations proved 
attractive because they saved labor and seemed to offer the best pro­
tection of invested capital.37 Environmental historian James McWil­
liams rightly contends: “Path dependency— in this case, the idea that 
agribusiness, the federal government, and the insecticide industry had 
chosen to fight insect infestations exclusively with chemicals—limited 
the way in which scientists and farmers framed the pest situation and 
contemplated their options.”38 Consequently the volume of insecticides 
applied to fields continued to climb as the twentieth century progressed 
and chemical controls became increasingly entrenched in agricultural 
pest management strategies.
Despite the growing chemical dependency in agriculture, scientists 
still knew little about the health effects of exposure to some of the most 
popular compounds. A consumer scare over arsenic on apples in 1925 
prompted the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to begin moni­
toring residues of lead arsenate. The agency had the approval of grow­
ers’ associations anxious for a rebound in consumer confidence, though 
some growers demanded justification for the new policy and proof that 
the substance posed a health threat.39 Assessing public risk in a widely 
varying populace of young, old, healthy, and infirm individuals proved 
a difficult task for the agency, particularly when attempting to find 
the chronic effects of low exposure to lead arsenate. The FDA opted 
to initiate animal-based experimentation, conducting lifetime feeding 
experiments on rats. It planned to make projections of risks to humans 
based on the findings.40 Growers’ associations opposed the research, 
fearing the results would lead to the establishment of low residue tol­
erance levels, and voiced their concerns to congressional allies.41 Test­
ing the chronic effects of a poison on humans, however, raised obvious 
moral problems and was not a feasible option. Still, Missouri Demo­
cratic Representative Clarence Cannon, who chaired the Agricultural 
Appropriations Subcommittee, responded by inserting a clause into the 
1937 budget bill that read: “no part of the funds appropriated by this
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act shall be used for laboratory investigations to determine the possible 
harmful effects on human beings of spray insecticides on fruits and 
vegetables.”42
The Public Health Service later undertook a study examining Wash­
ington orchard workers’ exposure to lead arsenate. The study, though, 
examined data that would show acute rather than long-lasting or slow- 
developing effects. The difference in design made the agency less able to 
determine the associated risk of chronic health problems than the preced­
ing FDA tests and yielded little useful information on the dangers of lead 
arsenate. Since the test results suggested that the chemical did not have 
severe health impacts, the Federal Security Administration raised residue 
tolerance levels for fruit. The action failed to generate a public response, 
because attention to the issue waned by the time that the Public Health 
Service completed its investigation. Little impetus existed to conduct addi­
tional tests, particularly when a well-organized agricultural lobby opposed 
further study.43
Attention soon shifted from lead arsenate to a new “miracle” chemi­
cal, DDT, during World War II. Its proven effectiveness seemingly 
provided a means by which farmers could exert total control over their 
insect enemies.44 Some scientists tempered their optimism because of the 
uncertain effects of DDT on beneficial bugs. Eradication of some non­
target insects had the possibility of increasing pest problems, and tests by 
pharmacologists also revealed that the compound accumulated in the fat 
cells of dogs. Prudence led some scientists to call for more testing before 
use became widespread. Nevertheless, glory stories of DDT decimating 
populations of mosquitoes and lice on the war front made the transi­
tion to civilian markets a near certainty, particularly because the lack 
of an appropriate regulatory framework made it nearly impossible for 
the government to keep any chemicals from being sold. The FDA had 
the power to set residue tolerance levels on foodstuffs and the USDA 
ensured that the poisons were correctly labeled, but neither could keep 
pesticides from being sold commercially if the labeling guidelines were 
followed.45
The manufacture and usage of DDT and other pesticides exploded 
after World War II. Production in the United States rose from 10 mil­
lion pounds in 1945 to 100 million pounds in 1951.46 Yet as the volume 
of use exponentially increased, indications suggested that D D T’s reign
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as a chemical miracle worker would be short. The common housefly 
and two strains of mosquitoes had developed resistance to the chemi­
cal by 1949, even when the application was ten times stronger than in 
previous years.47 New and powerful chemical combinations soon joined 
approximately twenty-five thousand other pesticide products registered 
for sale in 1947. The ever-changing and supersaturated nature of the 
pesticide marketplace made it extremely difficult for the government 
to monitor.48
Congress responded in 1947 with the passage of the Federal Insecti­
cide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), which required pesti­
cides to be registered with the USDA before being sold commercially. 
Manufacturers had to attest to a product’s safety and effectiveness by 
submitting a description of its chemical composition, results of residue 
tests, safety reports, analytical methodology, and the proposed label to 
the USDA’s Pesticide Regulation Division. New labels needed to include 
a warning about potential harm to humans, vertebrate animals, and veg­
etation (excepting weeds). The act also necessitated that companies add 
a dye to agricultural chemicals sold in white powder form, in hopes that 
the discoloration would prevent individuals from mistaking the poisons 
for similar-looking products (sugar, flour, salt, baking powder) used in 
cooking.49
State-level legislation preceded and sparked the congressional ac­
tion. Nine states passed laws to address a spate of injuries and deaths 
resulting from the accidental use of white powdered pesticides in food 
preparation. Fifty persons at a state hospital in Salem, Oregon died and 
467 others became ill after eating food contaminated with the insecticide 
sodium fluoride. A Salvation Army community center in Pennsylva­
nia mistook the same substance for flour and served food that killed 
twelve and sickened fifty-seven people. Similarly, a field cook in Texas 
unknowingly used an arsenic-based insecticide in the preparation of 
pancakes for farmworkers, resulting in the immediate death of a large 
number of men.50 New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Oregon, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Tennessee, and New Hampshire 
responded with legislation designed to minimize accidental poison­
ings, though the legislative provisions varied from state to state.51 The 
USDA, pesticide manufacturers, and distributors favored the passage of
FIFRA, because it would bring uniformity to pesticide regulation, vest­
ing enforcement responsibilities with the Department of Agriculture. 
The American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Grange, and the 
National Council of Farmer Cooperatives voiced support because the 
registration and labeling requirements promised to better protect grow­
ers from ineffective or harmful products. No consumer, conservation, 
or labor organization testified at the congressional hearings on FIFRA 
prior to its passage.52
FIFRA proved to be a relatively loose regulatory law that did little 
to keep dangerous agricultural chemicals off the market. Political sci­
entist Christopher Bosso asserts that the legislation, as originally passed, 
“displays all the dynamics of classic clientele politics . . . [because] the 
pesticides issue was not salient to any but those directly benefiting from 
pesticides, and the scope of the debate was severely limited to those most 
intimately involved.”53 If the USDA concluded that a pesticide did not 
comply with the tenets of the law, the agency could notify the company 
and provide opportunity for correction. The company, however, could 
refuse to follow the recommendations and register its product under 
protest.54 To force its removal from commercial markets, USDA had to 
prove the hazardousness of the pesticide in court. The length and diffi­
culty of this procedure helped assure that the agency would take a nonin­
terventionist approach.55 The Pesticide Registration Division consistently 
bowed to pressure when companies challenged a denied request.56 The 
regulation was so toothless that environmental lawyer William Rodg­
ers Jr. reported that the USDA had never “secured the cancellation of a 
registration in a contested case” in the twenty-three years following the 
law’s passage.57
Farmers’ growing chemical dependency remained unchecked and 
usage of pesticides grew exponentially through the 1950s. The pow­
erful new synthetic chemicals of the postwar era brought problems 
as well as promise. The indiscriminate poisons killed target species 
and beneficial bugs alike. The killing of insect predators eliminated a 
natural control of minor agricultural pests, allowing their numbers to 
explode to the point that they represented a serious secondary threat 
to farmers. The problems of pest resistance, pest resurgence, and the 
growth of secondary pest populations did not cause farmers to turn
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back toward biological and cultural controls. Rather, they invested 
even more heavily in chemical solutions.58 Pesticide companies funded 
entomological research in universities, government dollars financed 
field tests, and farmers struggled to stay a step ahead of their insect foes 
in order to meet the global demand for American agricultural products 
in the Cold War era.59 Pesticides, including those that posed a threat 
to human and environmental health, saturated the United States as it 
entered the 1960s.
2H i d d e n  H a n d s  o f  t h e  H a r v e s t
The modernization and professionalization of agriculture also reshaped 
many farm owners’ thinking about labor and production. Prior to the 
growth of an industrialized agricultural system, families and local hired 
hands handled the bulk of farm chores outside of the plantation South. 
This changed in the twentieth century as multitudes of migrant laborers 
shouldered the burden of work on large farms. Labor relations in this con­
text bore comparison to the relations between manager and employee in 
industrial settings, yet distinct differences between the field and the factory 
arguably made agricultural labor exceptional. While work increasingly 
followed an industrial logic, farm owners chose to stress the differences 
and argued that twentieth-century labor legislation should not apply to 
farmworkers. They regularly acted in concert with the government to 
deny farmworkers political power in order to maintain a cheap and plentiful 
supply of labor.
The industrial model of modern agriculture in the United States has 
roots in the slave South; its development in free society, however, can be
